ERC Starting Grant · 2016
Addressing Too Big to Fail: Resolution, Organizational Structure, and Funding of Global Banks
One of the main unresolved challenges of the recent financial crisis is how society should deal with global financial banks that are “too big to fail.” The collapse of Lehman Brothers vividly demonstrated the costs of the failure of such an institution, with sweeping repercussions for the financial system and the broader economy. Yet, implicit public guarantees that would prevent such failures are equally costly, creating moral hazard in the form of increased risk taking and incentives for financial institutions to become larger and more complex. The research in this proposal will address this dilemma. From a methodological perspective, my research will advance the state of the art in…
From the public funding record at EU CORDIS. Describes the funded project, not the reviews below.
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